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Diplomacy is the only real way forward in the Syrian conflict.
Military intervention could make the situation even worse.
Jun 19 2012
With the failure of the Annan Plan in Syria, the situation looks increasingly bleak. But Syria in
2012 is very different from Libya in 2011, and Western leaders should resist the temptation
for military intervention writes Chris Brown. Instead of calling for intervention, leaders like
François Hollande need to support the diplomacy of the Arab League and other non-Western
countries.
The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, with daily accounts of massacres by the Syrian
army and pro-Government militias, increasing sectarian violence on both sides (with dark
rumours of Al Qaeda involvement), and – a real sign of desperation – the UN suspending the
activities of its Monitors because of increased levels of violence. Time then for stocktaking and a review of
options for Europe and the international community.
The first thing that needs to be recognised is that the Annan Plan is dead – not because the cease-fire has
broken down, although that is true, but because the basic premise of the plan is invalid. Annan’s proposition
was that the two sides should end violence and then get round the table together to sort out the way forward;
this might just have worked a year ago, but whatever room for compromise might have existed then is now
gone – too much blood has been spilled, the opposition will accept nothing less than the dismantling of the
regime, which the regime itself will never accept. This is a war to the death which is currently being fought as
a low intensity civil war but which is likely to become ever more destructive unless there is effective
international intervention to reverse the dynamic.
At the moment the international
intervention that is taking place – Russian
and Iranian resupply and support to the
regime, Gulf state covert weapons supply
to the rebels and the arrival of foreign
fighters – is having the opposite effect of
ratcheting up the violence. What can be
done to reverse this trend?  Some 
unofficial voices on both sides of the
Atlantic are calling for NATO to intervene
militarily – Senator John McCain has been
particularly vocal – and in Europe both
Britain and, especially, France have
repeatedly called for Assad’s removal,
while leaving open the threat of military
intervention.  Interestingly President
Hollande has proved if anything rather
more hawkish than his predecessor, one
more irritant in his relations with Chancellor Merkel.
The US Administration, on the other hand, has attempted to dial down the rhetoric, arguing, correctly I think,
that a military intervention Libya-style could only make the situation worse. There are several crucial
differences between the situation in Syria and that in Libya last year which it may be worth discussing.  First,
in Libya there was a clear geographical divide between the rebel-held east and the Kaddafi-held west, which
meant that NATO could protect the rebel base in Benghazi and the East, giving the rebels the space in which
to organise their ultimately successful drive to the west. In Syria the rebellion is taking place in many non-
contiguous areas at once, with no obvious equivalent to Benghazi and Eastern Libya – although a limited
protected zone on the Turkish border might be a possibility, on which see below. Second, unlike Libya, Syria
has an effective air force and air-defence system with modern Russian-supplied equipment; doubtless NATO
would win a shooting war, but it would not be the walk-over that it was in Libya.  There would be heavy
casualties including many civilian dead. When enthusiasts advocate a ‘no-fly’ zone they call up images of
patrolling F14s and F18s sweeping the skies clear of enemy aircraft, but an effective ‘no fly’ zone can only be
established after a very intensive bombing campaign to suppress air-defences. In March 2011 over 100
cruise missiles and several hundred bombing sorties were needed to crush Kaddafi’s pathetically inadequate
air defences. Syria has 850 Surface to Air Missile launchers, 4,000 anti-aircraft guns, effective radar and early
warning systems, and several hundred modern combat aircraft, the exact number being a carefully preserved
secret (I.I.S.S. figures). Moreover, third, Syria, unlike Libya, has powerful friends and could rely on Russia and
Iran to resupply its military and, in the former case, to ensure that international intervention did not have the
backing of a UN Security Council resolution.
None of this suggests that a determined international intervention could not be successful, but it is clear that
such success would only come at a very high price most of which would be paid by the people of Syria. The
first rule of international interventions is – or should be – “don’t make things worse”. A full scale intervention
would almost certainly break this rule.
A more limited operation to establish a ‘protected zone’ on the Turkish border is the only military option that is
actually worth considering; apart from protecting those civilians who could reach it, such a zone could also
provide a base for the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Most of the aid that is getting to the rebels is going to
sectarian, Islamist elements and it would be good for more assistance to find its way to the FSA, which is the
nearest there is to a non-sectarian opposition to the Assad regime.  Moreover, it could be argued that Turkey
does not need UN sanction for such an action; under the terms of the Turkey-Syria Adana Agreement of
1998, Syria promises not to ‘permit any activity which emanates from its territory aimed at jeopardizing the
security and stability of Turkey’.  Turkey could argue that it is entitled to act to ensure that Syria lives up to its
legal obligations – and NATO could support Turkey under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  Since Adana
was actually about curbing Kurdish terrorism this would be somewhat disingenuous – to put it mildly – but
legal cases in support of international action in the past have been built on even shakier foundations.  Still,
such a limited action would only stay limited if Syria did not challenge the establishment of such a zone,
which is why Turkey is undecided whether to act and NATO members have not rallied round this option.
This leaves diplomacy as the only way forward. At the moment European and American diplomacy is directed
at persuading Russia either to allow a tougher UN response, or itself to act to undermine Assad. The
perception that Russia is the key to avoiding a full-scale civil war in Syria is probably correct, but what is less
clear is that the West is going about this the right way.  Russia has a lot of political capital tied up in Syria and
it is not going to change tack unless the costs of supporting Assad are increased substantially – and Western
disapproval cannot achieve this outcome, because Russia automatically discounts Western criticism. 
However, the Russian government is genuinely sensitive to disapproval expressed by the Global South –
thus, Russia sees itself as representing Southern anti-imperialism in the Security Council, and is extremely
uncomfortable when it finds itself (with China) on the losing end of a 13 – 2 vote in the Council, as happened
in February of this year.
What this suggests is that the best way for the West to get Russia to rethink its position on Syria would be for
American and European leaders to step back somewhat and allow the Arab League and other non-Western
countries to take centre stage.  There is no guarantee that this would work – but confronting Russia directly
certainly hasn’t; paradoxically, the best way that the West can help the people of Syria may be by dialling
down the rhetoric and being somewhat less vocal in their support.  Most of all – and this is something William
Hague and François Hollande in particular should note – uttering words about military intervention that you are
not actually prepared to back up with deeds is counter-productive and irresponsible.
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